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BOOK REVIEWS

CAPITAL THINKING
American Sea Power and the Obsolescence of Capital Ship Theory, by Robert B. Watts. Jefferson, NC:
McFarland, 2016. 232 pages. $45 (paperback).

Even though this book is arguably not
a comprehensive study, it deserves to
be read by all naval professionals and
anyone with a casual interest in the
U.S. Navy and how it historically has
defined its mission. I say this up front
because, although this review will be
critical in some areas, such observations
must never be allowed to diminish the
intrinsic value of works such as this:
advocacy pieces that set out to challenge
the prevailing (twentieth-century) naval
orthodoxy, with all its emphasis on platforms and technology. This orthodoxy is
the proverbial elephant in the room that
is rarely challenged in naval circles—and
yet it should be. In this reviewer’s
mind, therefore, it is absolutely healthy
for naval professionals to be exposed
constantly to such variations in thinking
and to be pressed continually to justify
their long-standing beliefs, even if only
to force a more coherent exposition of
the prevailing service position. For this
reason alone, authors such as Watts
provide immense value to the service.
Watts writes in an engaging and readable
style that makes this slim paperback
an easy and enjoyable read. The book
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breaks down naturally into three distinct
sections: a short, theoretical analysis
of Mahan and his effect on U.S. naval
thought a century ago; an examination
of how the U.S. Navy has evolved this
thinking to meet the momentous events
of the twentieth century, specifically
the two world wars and the Cold War;
and finally a look at how the Navy
has fared in the post–Cold War era, a
period characterized by increasingly
complex irregular conflicts on land.
The second section is the largest,
forming the backbone of the book and
containing a very useful summation of
the various iterations of naval thinking
and all the official strategic utterances
since 1945, right up to the modern-day
“air-sea battle.” Throughout it all, Watts’s
premise is that the U.S. Navy, for a
variety of bureaucratic and cultural
reasons, has remained overinvested in
what he calls the “capital ship theory,” a
focus on high-end, expensive platforms.
While these may offer flexibility in
a variety of scenarios, they may in
fact be something of a liability in this
new age of irregular warfare.
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Watts himself is eminently qualified
for this work. A retired captain in the
Coast Guard and an acknowledged
author on naval topics, he can call on
some thirty years of observing how the
services have grappled with the strategic
changes in the post-Vietnam era, not
to mention his firsthand experience
with what some would call the more
“irregular” missions of naval life. Not
surprisingly, he is at his best in describing the difficulties facing the naval
services in the post–September 11th era.
This is not to say there is no awkwardness in the logic Watts employs. For
one thing, he is rather nebulous when it
comes to the actual meaning of the term
“capital ship.” In the text he variously
refers to battleships and aircraft carriers
but also on occasion to “cruisers and destroyers” (p. 110) and, even more specifically, the DDG-51 class (and equivalent)
(pp. 120, 171) as being capital ships.
While in terms of raw combat power
this may be somewhat understandable,
this is not a trivial matter in this case.
The normally accepted definition of a
capital ship would be “one of the largest
and most heavily armed ships in a fleet,
usually understood to be battleships,
battle cruisers, and aircraft carriers,”
or words to that effect. The problem:
including everything from the DDG-51
on up in the definition means there are
precious few USN vessels today that are
not capital ships! While superficially
this may seem to strengthen Watts’s
case, it actually weakens his argument
in a number of important ways. Most
obviously, it might be construed that it
is the very notion of a “capital” ship, as
distinct from any other, that is obsolete
in this case, not the U.S. Navy’s long
adherence to the principles of a theorist
writing in an era in which there was a
clear distinction. If the capital ship idea
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is truly dead and the distinction is no
longer valid or recognized today, where
would Watts’s argument be then? It also
weakens the assertion he makes later
on that other navies have done a better
job of letting go of the capital ship than
the U.S. Navy. While I can think of a
number of navies that have abandoned
aircraft carriers and battleships, on
account of the expenses involved, very
few, I think, have abandoned the DDG
or the advanced FFG as the prime
movers of global influence. If, using his
logic, these are in fact capital ships, then
most navies would seem to be following
a trajectory remarkably similar to that
of the United States. Interestingly too,
Watts seems not to include nuclear
submarines in this mix, yet I know of at
least one navy—the United Kingdom’s
Royal Navy—that has often equated
these vessels to the capital ships of yore
on account of their immense powerprojection and antifleet capabilities.
The second difficulty is the author’s
assumption that Mahan’s theories on
decisive battle and his capital ship theory
are synonymous and interchangeable.
Mahan, of course, was writing about the
preindustrial age and in an era when
the only threat to that determinant of
naval power, the battleship, was another
battleship. Under those circumstances,
the possession of the most up-to-date
and powerful fleet of battleships that
one could afford made a lot of sense,
as did the exhortation to keep the fleet
concentrated. The advent of the industrial age changed all this, however, in
two important ways. First, the extreme
mobility conferred on smaller ships by
turbine propulsion and the development
of new weapons such as the Whitehead
torpedo made the battleships vulnerable
to smaller platforms that cost a fraction
of a battleship’s cost. This was perhaps
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the first time in naval history when a
third-rate navy might threaten the largest fleets in the world effectively. Second,
the industrial powers’ need for resources
and markets on a global scale widened
the scope of naval strategic responsibilities immeasurably. This navies were
slow to appreciate, but (to cut a long
story very short) the likes of Admiral
Fisher in Britain with his battle cruiser
ideas in 1905 and Admiral Fournier
in France with his general-purpose
cruisers (“bon à tout faire”—able to
do anything) a few years earlier slowly
but inexorably moved the focus away
from a defensive clash of battle fleets
around the point of decision toward
the use of offensive power-projection
fleets around the periphery to ensure
protection of these wider strategic
interests. This offensive approach was
taken up most notably by the carrier
power-projection fleets of the U.S. Navy
in the post–World War II era. In other
words, the “capital ship theory” that the
U.S. Navy has held dear through all these
years is this offensive power-projection
version, not the original Mahanian
ideas of a half-century earlier. Watts
does not make this distinction clear.
Watts’s third discontinuity, which is
more of an omission than anything
else, is his lack of consideration of
network-centric warfare (NCW) as a
possible alternative to his capital ship
theory. While he mentions the concept
very briefly in passing (p. 129), he
chooses not to explain that it actually
argues against capital ship theory by
maintaining that, in this era of reliable
and near-instantaneous data sharing, it
is the integrity of the network among the
various platforms that is vital, not the
security of any individual unit attached
to it. No one ship needs to have all the
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“sensors and shooters” in a discrete
package if each can draw what it lacks
from the others in the network. This
again makes it something of an antithesis of capital ship theory, considering the
latter’s focus on the platforms involved.
As such, the NCW concept is worthy of
inclusion here, if only to explore why
the U.S. Navy supposedly rejected it
(although aspects of it have survived in
the current “distributed lethality” idea).
In the end, this reviewer was not
persuaded by the arguments as
presented, but this in no way should
be taken as a rejection of the book’s
core idea itself. Watts’s volume is
valuable insofar as it encourages the
reader to think of alternative organizational strategies for the U.S. Navy; it is,
however, incomplete, in that formulating
a comprehensive conclusion requires
the three objections discussed above to
be addressed at some point. The book
also does not offer any defense for
the generalist position and the many
virtues of capable, multipurpose ships
across the range of military operations,
nor any alternative to this force, which
presumably would have to include a
larger number of specialist platforms.
One hopes this will form a new point of
departure for future work in this area.
ANGUS ROSS

Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future, by Henry D. Sokolski. 2nd ed. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2015.
159 pages. Free.

Henry Sokolski has been a fixture of
Washington’s nuclear nonproliferation
community for several decades and in
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